This note proposes a two-country monopolistic competition model of service trade that captures the role of time zone di erences as a determinant of trade patterns. It is shown that the utilization of time zone di erences induces drastic change in trade patterns: Due to taking advantage of time zone di erences, service rms learve larger countries for smaller countries.
Introduction
A tremendous change is taking place in the world economy: globalization, caused by the communications revolution and by the deterioration of barriers to international trade. It is now well recognized that there are many kinds of trade, particularly in service sectors such as banking, engineering, retailing, software development and so forth, which do not require physical shipments of products. 1 The rise of the Indian software industry provides a prime example. The programming problems of some U.S. corporations are e-mailed to India at the end of the U.S. workday. Indian software engineers work on them during their regular o ce hours and provide solutions. By the time the o ces reopen in the U.S., the solutions have already arrived, mainly as e-mail attachments. 2 Ireland, pitching to host Europe's main international call centers, o ers another example. Cairncross (1997, p. 219 ) emphasized the rise of the call-center service industry in Ireland, which is taking geo- 1 Freund and Weinhold (2002) found that Internet penetration, which is measured by the number of Internet hosts in a country, has a positive and signi cant e ect on service trade. 2 graphical advantage of being in between the U.S. and Europe. These types of service trade require two basic conditions. First, there must be a di erence in time zones between the trading partners. Second, there must be good connections via communications networks (e.g., the Internet) which enable the services to be \transported" quickly with little cost. In other words, thanks to the communications revolution, time zone di erences can become a primary driving force behind service trade. This seems to suggest that the focus on \market proximity" as an advantage in service provision should be accompanied by focus on a time zone (or remoteness) advantage.
In The key assumption is that domestic service production requires one workday and that products are ready for sale after one workday: domestic delivery bears signi cant costs. In contrast to this, the utilization of communications networks allows production in a foreign country where nooverlapping work hours and service trade via networks enable a quick delivery and low shipping costs. In other words, imported services whose production bene ts from time zone di erences realize higher value than domestically produced services. Although this assumption is at odds with that of the standard monopolistic competition model with trade costs (e.g., Krugman 1980), 5 it captures the idea that consumers would like to have services sooner than later. On the basis of the model outlined above, we will show that the utilization of communications networks induces drastic change in industrial structure due to rm relocation to take advantage of time zone di erences.
In Section 2 we present basic model. In Section 3 we deal with the question of trade patterns, which is followed by concluding remarks presented in Section 4.
The Model
Suppose there are two countries, Home and Foreign, and that they are identical in regard to tastes and technology. 6 There is only one factor of production, namely labor, and relative country size is measured by labor force size. Let The central assumption is that there are positive costs for the delivery 6 In this way, we rule out Ricardian comparative advantage. 7 This assumption is taken from Marjit (2007).
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of di erentiated services. We assume that the production of each service requires one workday. Then, one unit of service which is produced in Home is ready for sale after one workday. In order to capture this point, we assume that domestic shipments of di erentiated services incur the \iceberg" e ect of delivery costs: for every t (t > 1) units shipped, only one unit arrives. Thus, the price of a Home service to Home consumers will be tp, where p is the producer's price for the service. In other words, we can interpret (t 1)=t as a rate of discount. Although we do not explicitly model consumption behavior, this seems to be a reasonable assumption.
Another important assumption is that, if the utilization of communications networks becomes possible, a country can import di erentiated services more quickly. For every t 0 units shipped, one unit arrives. The key assumption is the following condition:
Note that this e ect comes not from lower production costs in Foreign, but from the quick delivery. This assumption intends to capture the idea that production taking advantage of time zone di erences increases the value of each service.
We assume constant expenditure shares between the di erentiated services and the numeraire, and that the subutility for the former takes the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) form:
is the consumption level of the Home (Foreign) services, is the elasticity of substitution between di erentiated services, and n (n ) is the number of products available from Home (Foreign). The price index for the di erentiated services that is dual to the subutility D is represented by
1= (1 ) :
(2)
The Home consumers' derived demand for a Home service is 8
where is the share of spending devoted to di erentiated services. Similarly, the derived demand for a Foreign service from Home consumers is
A producer of a di erentiated service has to commit units of labor as a xed cost and has constant marginal input . With the total number of services available to consumers being very large, each producer chooses its constant markup price as p = ( )=( 1): (5) Free entry ensures that the equilibrium output per service, x, is constant, common across countries, and independent of the level of delivery costs:
Before turning to the trading equilibrium, we must draw attention to the autarky equilibrium (i.e., t 0 is prohibitively high due to the lack of communications networks). In autarky, the number of di erentiated services in each country is given by
refers to the value in the autarky equilibrium. Units are chosen so that one country's autarky number of varieties equals its relative size, i.e., by setting ( L= ) = 1, we obtain n A = ; n A = 1 :
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Service Trade via Communications Networks
Let us turn to the case of service trade via communications networks. 9 In this case, the service market equilibrium requires that supply equal demand for each Home service: x = c + c 0 . Substituting (3), the Foreign counterpart of 9 It is natural to assume that there is an additional cost of the introduction of communications networks. However, to keep matters simple, assume that there are no additional costs. Kikuchi (2005) discusses implication of the xed investment costs of communications networks as a determinant of trade.
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(4), and (6) into this equation and denoting t 1 and 0 t 0 1 ( 0 > ) yields the following equilibrium condition for a Home product and its foreign counterpart:
Using (8) and (9), the equilibrium number of varieties can be obtained:
Using (7) and (10), the changes in Foreign production structure brought about by utilizing time zone di erences can be shown as n n A = 0 0 (2 1):
If Foreign is the smaller country (i.e., > 1=2), it will attract more service rms by utilizing communications networks. This outcome implies that producers prefer producing in the country next to the larger country, in order to take advantage of time zone di erences. 10 This e ect can be interpreted as a variant of the home market e ect, which is emphasized in the trade literature. the welfare gains due to opening trade is 0 , which becomes larger as a reduction in the delivery costs becomes larger (i.e., a larger 0 ).
Concluding Remarks
Both deeper market integration and advances in digital technology have driven a particularly large decrease in the costs of service provision. In this 11 Note that both countries will produce di erentiated services only if lies in the range
note, we propose a two-country monopolistic competition model of service trade that captures the role of time zone di erences. We have shown that the utilization of communications networks induces drastic changes in industrial structure caused by rms taking advantage of time zone di erences:
service rms move away from larger countries in favor of smaller countries.
Although these results are derived under the speci c assumption that the delivery costs of imported services are lower than for domestically provided services, it appears that something similar to this will occur for the more general setting we consider here.
The present analysis must be regarded as tentative. Hopefully it provides a useful paradigm for considering how time zone di erences a ect both the structure of service provision and trade patterns. The model could be enriched with the inclusion of both FDI and outsourcing aspects in order to analyze the organization of rms. 12 
